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I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The issue at trial was whether defendants-respondents 
Bruce and Gary Andersons' (hereinafter referred to as respon-
dents) decision not to purchase property owned by plaintiffs-
apflellants Quealys and Ngs (hereinafter referred to as appel-
lants) had been excused under the terms of the "Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase" agreement. The issue on appeal 
is the propriety of Judge Banks' award of attorneys' fees to 
respondents, as the prevailing parties, based on the following 
provision of the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase• 
agreement: 
•we do hereby agree to carry out and 
fulfill the terms and conditions spe-
cified above . . . If either partl 
fails so to do, he agrees to pay al 
expenses of enforcing this agreement, 
or of any right arising out of the 
breach thereof, including a reasonable 
attorneys' fee.• 
Line 45-48, Exhibit 2-P. {emphasis 
added) 
II. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter came to trial on June 28, 1982, before the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, sitting with a jury. The jury returned 
a special verdict after hearing five days of testimony and 
examining fifty-three exhibits. Based on the jury's answers to 
the special verdict questions respondents were awarded a judg-
ment of d1slilissal, no cause ot action, on July 9, 1982. Judge 
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Banks subsequently awarded respondents $24,677.00 in attuti•'-'i'' 
fees and costs, based on his interpretation of the lan'J'' ,. 1 
quoted above from the "Earnest Money Receipt and Utffc'r t. 
Purchase • agreement. Appellants appeal only from the award of 
attorneys' fees. 
III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that Judge Banks' award of attor-
neys' fees and costs was proper, and ask this Court to affirn 
the judgment and to award respondents costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees in defending this appeal. Respondents are not 
pursuing their cross-appeal, which sought a modification of 
Judge Banks' award, because respondents have determined that 
the trial court acted within its discretion. 
IV. 
FACTS 
References to the Record on Appeal wi 11 be designated 
("R") except for references to exhibits ("Ex"). 
The issue raised on appeal is whether Judge Banks pro-
perly exercised his discretion in awarding respondents attor-
neys' fees for successfully defending against a claim of breach 
of an "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase• agreement. 
In July of 1977,. respondents and appellant Jay A. 
Quealy agreed that respondents would purchase approximately BOC 
acres of land, owned by appellants, located two miles east uf 
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HeLer cir;. Respondents planned to subdivide the property into 
residential lots. However, respondents' plan was necessarily 
contingent upon the presence of adequate water and the receipt 
of zoning approval from Wasatch County. 
The purchase agreement was executed on a standard 
"Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" form (Ex. P-2). 
Reflecting the use respondents planned to make of the 
property, the purchase was made contingent upon developing an 
adequate supply of water and procuring residential zoning 
approval. These conditions were added to the agreement in 
paragraphs 52j., which reads as follows: 
This offer 
conditions. 
is made subject to the following 
1. Assurance of an adequate culinary and 
irrigation water system to meet the 
needs of residential development of the 
property. 
2. Assurance of proper zoning to develop 
the property into residential lots. 
3. Satisfaction 
lines. 
of the boundary [sic l 
As the jury subsequently found (Special Verdict, R.556-557), 
the condition that proper zoning be obtained was never met, 
thereby enaing defendants' purchase obligation. 
Appellants made no further demands upon respondents 
for perforr.1ance until more·.than two years after the agreement 
had been signed, when appellants filed this suit alleging 
respondents breached the agreement by failing to purchase the 
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property (Complaint, R.12-16). Respondents raised numeruuh 
affirmative defenses in their Answer, including the Te11t1 
Defense that the agreement had been abandoned (R. 19-28). At 
trial, however, the dispute was narrowed to whether respon-
dents' performance had been excused by the non-occurrence of 
the conditions set forth in paragraph 52.j. and whether an 
accord and satisfaction had been reached regarding the issue uf 
performance. Only these issues were submitted to the jury 
(Spe.cial Verdi ct, R. 556-557). 
The respondents prevailed on the jury's answers to the 
following Special Verdict questions: 
1. Did defendants Bruce and Gary Anderson 
satisfy their obligations under the 
agreements to attempt to obtain the 
preliminary indication of the zoning 
change to permit the 1-5 acre lot 
preferred by defendants? YES 
2. Did Wasatch County officers give a pre-
liminary indication of assurance that a 
zoning change would be approved to 
permit the 1-5 acre lot development 
planned by defendants? NO 
4. were the claims asserted by plaintiff 
Jay A . Que a 1 y in this., 1 aw s u i t the 
subject of a settlement and accord with 
defendants? YES 
Based on these answers, respondents were awarded a judgment of 
dismissal, no cause of acti"Qn (Judgment, R.622-625). 
Respondents, as the prevailing parties, proffered tes-
timony as to their attorneys' fees (Transcript re: Attorneys' 
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Fees, July L, 1982, at p.2, R.736). Respondents did not 
"incongruously assert" as contended by Appellants (Appellants 
Brief, pp. 7-8) that the contract had been suddenly resur-
rected. Rather, respondents argued that they were entitled to 
an award of attorneys' fees because: 
In this case we [had] to defend our 
rights to stand by the conditions in the 
agreement. It's a right arising out of 
this agreement, and we incurred sub-
stantial attorneys' fees in doing that. 
(Transcript re: Attorneys' Fees, July 2, 1982, p. 1-d, R.734). 
Respondents were awarded these fees pursuant to the 
district court's interpretation of lines 45 through 48 of the 
"Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" agreement, which 
reads as follows: 
•we do hereby agree to carry out and 
fulfill the terms and conditions speci-
fied above, and the seller agrees 
to furnish good and marketable title 
with a policy of title insurance in the 
name of the purchaser and to make final 
conveyance by warranty deed or warranty 
deed: in the event of sale of other 
than real property, seller will provide 
evidence of title or right to sell or 
lease. If either party fails so to do, 
he agrees to pay all expenses of 
enforcing this agreement, or of any 
right arising out of the breach 
thereof, including a reasonable attor-
neys' fee." (emphasis added) (Ex. P-2, 
R. 9-10) 
Appellants' only 9bjection to respondents' proffer was 
that respondents were not entitled to an award of fees under 
the language of the agreement (Transcript re: Attorneys' Fees, 
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July 2, 1981, p. 1-c, R.733). The question of awarding cttt"r-
neys' fees was taken under advisement by Judge Banks, wh, 
directed respondents to submit their attorneys' fees and cc•stc 
to the court (Transcript re: Attorneys' Fees, July 2, 1982, PP-
2-3, R.736-737). 
Respondents submitted a Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs to the trial court on July 9, 1982 (R. 619-622) and a 
Supplemental Affidavit (R. 628-629), on August 11, 1982 as to 
the ,amount of fees. Appellants do not challenge the reason-
ableness of the amount of the fee award; appellants only 
challenge the correctness of the award itself to respondents as 
prevailing parties. 
Both parties also submitted rner.10randa on the issue of 
whether Judge Banks' award of attorneys' fees to respondents 
was proper (Plaintiff's Mernorandur.i in Opposition, dated July 
13, 1982 (R. 703-713); Defendants' Memorandum in Support, dated 
August 11, 1982 (R. 630-656)). Appellants, in their mernor-
andum, made five arguments in opposition to the award (all of 
which were rejected by the trial court): 
(1) the language of the "Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase• agreement did not support an 
award of attorneys' fees to respondents (R. 709); 
( 2) respondenlos had not made a timely proffer of 
attorneys' fees, hence there was no evidence in the 
record to support an award {R. 705); 
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(3) equity did not support such an award (R. 711); 
( 4) respondents were not really the prevailing 
parties (R. 704); 
5) respondents should be precluded from receiving 
attorneys' fees because they had amended their proffer 
(R. 707). 
Appellants did not argue or even raise the issue 
before Judge Banks that respondents should be estopped from 
relyin':J on the contract. The only argument made to the trial 
court that has been reasserted on appeal is appellants' first 
argur;ient that the language of the "Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase• agreement did not support an award. 
Judge Banks scheduled a hearing on the award of attor-
neys' fees on January 5, 1983 Appellants acknowledged that 
the respondents' proffer of fees on July 2, 1982 was timely 
(Transcript of Motion for Attorneys Fees, Jan. 5, 1983, p. 12) 
and in opposition to the award raised only the first, third and 
fifth arguments listed above (Transcript of Motion for Attor-
neys Fees, Jan. 5, 1982, pp. 12-19). Judge Banks interpreted 
the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer tv Purchase• agreement to 
require a reciprocal award of attorneys' fees: 
If one is entitled to it the other is 
entitled to it. 
(Transcript of Motion for l\ttorneys Fees, Jan. 5, 1983, p. 5) 
Based upon these findings, respondents were awarded attorneys' 
fees and costs in the amount of $24,877.00. 
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v. 
ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANTS' ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT IS RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND SHOULD 
NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COUR7 
Appellants' first argument is that respondents should 
be estopped from recovering attorneys' fees because they 
prevailed on their defenses of failure of a condition precedent 
and settlement and accord. This argument should not be 
considered by this court because appellants failed to raise the 
issue in the trial court. Regardless of the substance of 
appellants' argument, the decisions of this Court make it clear 
that this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Mortenson v. Financial Growth, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 54, 456 P.2d 
181 (1969), on appeal after rem'd, 523 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1974); 
Bekins Bar v Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church of Beryl, Iron 
County, 642 P.2d 371 (Utah 1982). 
The case of Higgins v. City of Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192 
(Utah 1981) is illustrative. Plaintiff, a general contractor, 
sued the City of Fillmore for breach· of a construction con-
tract. The city counterclaimed alleging the contract had not 
been finished on time. The trial court found for defendant on 
the ground that the city i?ad delayed completion of the work. 
On appeal the city argued that "the contract was divisible and 
that delays on one portion did not affect work on the remain-
-8-
der•. l.'.:!· at 194. This Court refused to address the argument 
as it had not been made to the trial court. See also 
Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981). 
Although appellants have abandoned all but one of the 
arguments made to the trial court, this belated change in 
strategy does not allow appellants to raise an entirely new 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
Any argument by appellants based upon one or more of 
respondents' numerous alternative defenses is similarly 
misplaced. Plaintiffs 
any of these defenses 
never claimed in the trial court that 
barred defendants' right to attorneys' 
fees. Because the trial court never had the opportunity to 
address, consider, or decide this issue, it should not be con-
sidered now by this Court. 
B. NEITHER THE JURY llOT THE TRIAL COURT 
MADE ANY FINDING EXTINGUISHIHG DEFENDANTS' 
CONTRAC7UAL RIGHT TO ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The "estoppel" issue is not only improperly before the 
Court, it is also without merit. Appellants' argue that based 
upon B.L.T. Investment Company v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 
1978), respondents are estopped from recovering attorneys' fees 
since the contract had been rescinded. This argument has two 
fatal flaws. First, this -<:ase is clearly distinguishable from 
B.L.T. Investment company v. Snow, Id. In the instant case 
neither the jury nor trial court found that the "Earnest Money 
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Receipt and Offer to Purchase• agreement had been rescinded or 
abandoned. second, appellants' argument rests on the incorrect 
premise that the non-occurrence of a condition precedent anrl 
the occurrence of an accord and satisfaction are the functional 
equivalents of rescission of the entire contract. 
1. Respondents were Not Awarded Rescission of the 
Agreement 
In BLT Investment, the court held that if a party 
successfully seeks rescission of a contract, the party cannot 
be awarded attorneys' fees based on a provision in the 
rescinded contract. Appellants recite at length from a diverse 
collection of pleadings and other court documents (pp. 
through 12 of Appellant's Brief) in an attempt to show that the 
reasoning in BLT Investment should be applied in this case. 
Appellant's efforts, however, hide the fact that this case is 
clearly distinguishable from BLT Investment. In this case the 
trial court did not grant rescission of the agreement. The 
reasoning Of BL'.L Investment does not apply when the trial court 
has not awarded rescission. Usinger v. Cam12bell, 572 P.2d 1018 
(Oregon 1977): woodruff v. McClellan; 622 p. 2d 1268 (Wash. 
1980): Anaheim Com12any v. Elliott, 609 P.2d 382 (Or. App. 
1980): si12e v. Pearson, 556 P.2d 654 (Or. 197 6); Ro12er v. Neet, 
591 P.2d 423 (Or. App., 1979). A brief comparison of the facts 
of BLT Investment with this case, and with the cases that are 
applicable illustrate the crucial distinctions. 
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In BLT Investment, plaintiff-purchaser sued for speci-
fic performance of a written land-sales contract. Defendant-
seller Snow affirmatively sought and was awarded rescission of 
the contract. The central issue in the case was whether the 
grounds asserted by defendant (i.e.- the failure of the parties 
to reach a satisfactory escrow agreement) were sufficient for 
the court to grant rescission of the contract. Moreover, once 
the trial court decided to award rescission, it ordered a 
return of the parties to their status quo. 
In this case the issue of whether the contract was 
rescinded was never 
tions, R.522-555, 
even submitted to the jury (Jury Instruc-
Special Verdict, R.556-557). Although 
respondents did plead in the alternative that the contract was 
rescinqed, Judge Banks determined that rescission was not 
applicable to the facts of the case. Rather he determined that 
the facts could support only the defenses of accord and satis-
faction and failure of a condition preceC::ent. On appeal this 
determination is entitled to a great degree of deference and a 
presumption of correctness. Litho sales Inc. v cutrubus, 636 
P.2d 487 (Utah 1981); Car Doctor Inc. v Belmont, 635 P.2d 82 
(Utah 1981). 
Si nee the trial court did not order or grant rescis-
sion of the agreement (Jud'ijment, R. 622-623), nor attempt to 
return the parties to the status quo existing before the con-
tract had been entered, BLT Investment does not apply. The 
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reasoning in BLT Investrilent is sililply that if a party success-
fully rescinds an agreement in its entirety, it cannot then usr 
a provision in the rescinded contract for its own benefit. 
Conversely, however, when a party is excused from only a por-
tion of his performance, or only a of the contract is 
settled, there is no basis for denying attorneys' fees sought 
under a different portion of the contract. 
usinger v. Campbell, 572 P.2d 1018 (Oregon 1977), 
illustrates the reasons for not extending BLT Investment to bar 
attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants asserting defenses 
similar to those asserted by defendants here. Two affirmative 
defenses raised by the defendants in Usinger are identical to 
those raised here: 1) that the earnest money agreement sued 
upon too vague to be enforced, and; 2) plaintiffs had not 
performed certain conditions "precedent" as required under the 
agreement. Defendants prevailed on both defenses and were 
awarded attorneys' fees under a provision of the contract 
similar to the one in this case. On appeal, the award of 
attorneys' fees was challenged on the exact grounds argued 
here: defendants should not be awarded' attorneys' fees because 
they elected to 'rescind' the contract and hence should not be 
allowed to rely upon the terms of the agreelilent. 
Plaintiff's argume:it was rejected. The Oregon supreme 
Court upheld the attorneys' fees award and explicitly discussed 
-12-
why the reasoninc, of cases like BLT Investments was not appli-
cable: 
Pickinpaugh is distinguishable from the case 
at bar. In that case plaintiff came into 
court seeking a rescission of the contract. 
The trial court allowed rescission and this 
court affirmed. We relied upon 3 H. Black, 
Rescission and Cancellation § 583 (1916) for 
the proposition that the plaintiff could not 
assert that the contract should be rescinded 
and at the sar.ie time rely on a provision 
therein for the recovery of attorney fees. 
In this case, the plaintiffs contend there 
was a contract and ask for specific perfor-
mance. This requires the defendant to come 
into court and defend, also relying on the 
contract by stating that it was not 
performed in accordance with its terr.is. 
Defendant does not disaffirm the contract 
but relies on the exact terr.is thereof. 
Therefore, the provision in the contract 
providing for attorney fees applies. 
(er.iphasis added) 
Usinger at 1023. 
The reasoning of Usinger was followed and expanded by 
the Oregon Court of Appeals in Anaheim co. v Elliott, 609 P.2d 
382 (Or. App. 1980). In that case, plaintiff sued to foreclose 
a mortgage on real property held by defendant. Defendant 
denied plaintiff's general allegations and counterclaimed for 
rescission or cancellation of the mor.tgage. The trial court 
dismissed plaintiff's cause of action and awarded defendant 
attorney's fees based on a provision in the mortgage. Plain-
tiff argued on appeal that si nee defendant asserted that the 
mortgage was void and unenforceable, he should not be allowed 
to "[avail] himself of the attorney's fees provision." Id. at 
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386. The Court of Appeals upheld the award because the trial 
court never ruled on the rescission claim: 
As in Pickinpaugh, the defendant here sought 
through his counterclaim to rescind the 
instrument which provided for recovery of 
attorney's fees by the prevailing party. 
However, the counterclaim was not tried, and 
the prayer for rescission of the mort<:Jage is 
effectively mooted by the dismissal of the 
cause of suit for foreclosure •... As in 
usinger the issue which was tried here was 
plaintiff's claim that a document •.. should be 
enforced ..• [w)e interpret Pickenpaugh as 
being inapplicable to cases like the present 
one which are initiated to enforce contracts 
which provide for attorney's fees. (citations 
and footnotes omitted). 
Id. at 386. 
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court, in Woodruff v. 
McClellan, 622 P.2d 1268 (Wash. 1980), went even a step further 
and awarded attorneys fees to the successful defendants even 
though the trial court had found that the contract was 
rescinded. As in Usinger, plaintiffs sued for specific perfor-
mance of an earnest money agreement. The trial court found 
that plaintiffs had breached the agreer.ient by not making a 
timely proffer of money and therefore, the agreement was 
rescinded. Attorneys fees were awarded to defendants. Plain-
tiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court could not rely on 
a provision in the rescinded contract to make the award. 
Although an intermediate appeals court agreed, plaintiffs' 
reasoning was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Court 
reasoned that since plaintiffs sued to enforce the agreement 
they had not agreed to rescind the agreement. Therefore, the 
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clause providing for an award of attorney's fees remained in 
effect. See also, the other cases cited on page 11 of this 
brief. 
2. There was no Finding that the Earnest Money 
Agreement was void, Rescinded or Abandoned. 
Even if this court decided that the reasoning of BLT 
Investment should not be limited, Judge Banks' award to respon-
dents is proper. The rationale of BLT Investment applies only 
where the entire contract, including the attorneys' fees provi-
sion, is void or extinguished. In this case, however, neither 
the jury nor the court found that the earnest money agreement 
was void or extinguished. Rather, the only findings were that 
a condition precedent to defendants' purchase obligation had 
not been met (Special verdict No. 2, R. 556), and that there 
was a settlement on this issue (Special verdict No. 4, R.556). 
These findings are, of course, entitled to a presumption of 
validity. Kohler v Garden City, 639 P.2d 169 (Utah 1981), 
Charlton v Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 17G (1961). Since 
the entire "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase• agree-
ment was not extinguished, the trial. court correctly relied 
upon the attorneys' fees provision to make the award. 
Contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, condition prece-
dents do not necessarily to the validity of a contract. 
A valid, fully enforceable contract may contain conditions, the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of which determine only whether 
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future performance is necessary. The followiny excerpt from 
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Section 666, explains: 
In the law of contracts, conditions may 
relate to the existence of contract or to 
the duty of immediate performance under 
them. It is a source of confusion of 
thought that the word •condition" is fre-
quently used without exact recognition of 
what the supposed condition qualifies. 
Generally in contracts, when reference is 
made to conditions, what is meant are the 
conditions which become operative after 
formation of the contract and qualify the 
duty of immediate performance of a promise 
or promises thereunder not conditions 
which qualify the existence of a contract or 
promise. (emphasis added) 
Sweet v. Stormont Vai 1 Regional Medi cal Center, 647 
P.2d 1274 (Kansas 1982) (cited on p. 15, Appellants' Brief) 
illustrates that failure of a condition precedent does not 
destroy the remaining provisions of the contract. In Sweet, 
appellant claimed she was entitled to vacation pay upon termi-
nation, even though she had not given two weeks notice as 
required in the contract. The court decided that the two weeks 
notice was a condition precedent to receiving vacation pay. 
Since appellant had failed to satisfy this condition, she was 
not entitled to an award of vacation pay. However, the employ-
ment contract was not voided. See also Hurt v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 51 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1931), Engle v. First National 
Bank of Chugwater, 590 P.2d-.826 (Wyo. 1979). 
The failure to procure residential zoning (Special 
Verdict Nos. 1 and 2, R. 556) did not go to the existence ot 
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the cont r<:ict. The parties reached agreement on the sale of 
appellants' property in the Summer of 1976, at which time the 
"Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" agreement was 
executed. Both parties spent the next year operating under the 
terms of the agreement. Respondents expended considerable sums 
of money and time to acquire the necessary zoning changes 
(Trial Brief, R. 669-675). The parties agreed upon extensions 
of the time for performance. The actions of both parties are 
inconsistent with the argument that the existence of a valid 
and enforceable contract was conditional. See Davis v. 
DuniC;Jan, 205 P.2d 839 (Oregon, 194:1). 
In this case, the limited effect of the condition pre-
cedent is evidenced in the instruction given to the jury 
regarding condition precedent (Jury Instruction 
R.540). The instruction reaus as follows: 
In the law of contracts, a condition prece-
dent is a fact or event, not certain to exist 
or occur, which the parties to a contract 
intend must exist or occur before performance 
under the contract becomes due. If the con-
dition precedent is not fulfilled, or the 
fact or event does not exist or occur, the 
right to enforce the contract not arise. 
Because parties to a contract can only be 
held 1 i able according to the terms of the 
promises they make, no liability can arise on 
the promises which the conditions precedent 
qualify. (emphasis added) 
No. 18, 
Appellants also misunderstand the impact of an accord 
and satisfaction (Special verdict No. 4, R-556). An "accord" 
and •satisfaction" does not necessarily discharge an entire 
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contract. Jury Instruction No. 21 (R.543), quoted by Appel-
lants on Page 17 of their brief, clearly reflects this: 
An accord and satisfaction is a method of 
[either] discharging a contract, or settling 
a claim arising from the contract, by sub-
stituting for such a contract or claim an 
agreement for the satisfaction 
(emphasis added). 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1386 
(Utah 1977). 
The breadth of the accord is limited to those disputes 
and which were contemplated by both parties at the time 
the accord was reached. Mullins v. Evans, 560 P.2d 1116 (Utah 
1977); Plywood Marketing Assoc. v. Astoria Plywood Corp. 558 
P.2d 283, 289 (Wash. App. 1976); Scantlin v. Superior Homes, 
Inc., 627 P .2d 825 (Kansas 1981). This is because the accord 
•must be consummated, by the assent or the meeting of the minds 
of the parties, to the agreement.• (Emphasis added) . Cannon 
v. Stevens School of Business, Inc. at 1386. If the scope of 
the agreement is not understood by both parties, there is no 
"meeting of the minds", and hence no •accord". 
In this case, when the accord was entered into, the 
only issue in dispute was respondents' obligation to purchase 
the property. Settlement of any claims for attorneys' fees was 
neither contemplated nor agreed upon. Therefore, it was not 
Within the scope Of the accord entered into by the parties. 
The accord had the limited effect of discharging some of the 
mutual obligations surrounding purchase of appellancs' property. 
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C. THI:: LANGUAGE: OF THE ATTORNEYS' FEES PROVISION 
OF THE "EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO 
PURCHASE" AGREEMENT REQUIRES AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO DEFENDANT 
1. Respondents have enforced a right arising out of 
the Agreement. 
The only reasonable interpretation of the attorneys' 
fees provision of the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase" agreement (lines 45-48, Exhibit "2-P") is that the 
prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. 
This interpretation is clearly "in accordance with the ordinary 
and usual meaning of the words used", [Plain City Irrigation 
Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 191, 356 P.2d 
625, 627 (1960) ], and was adopted by Judge Banks. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the attorneys' 
fees provision is set out once again: 
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill 
the terms and conditions specified above, 
and the seller agrees to furnish good and 
marketable title with a policy of title 
insurance in the name of the purchaser and 
to make final conveyance by warranty deed or 
warranty deed in the event of. sale of other 
than real property, seller will provide 
evidence of title or right to sell or 
lease. If either party fails so to do, he 
agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this 
agreement, or of any right arising out of 
the breach thereQf, including a reasonable 
attorneys' fee. 
Only the first part of the first sentence ("We do 
hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the terms and conditions 
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specified above") and the last sentence (starting with "lf 
either party .") are important in this case. The seconri 
part of the first sentence deals with marketable title and con-
veyance by warranty deed, neither of which is at issue here. 
By the terms of the first part of the first sentence, both 
parties are required to abide by the terms of the agreement. 
The results 
the second 
or consequences 
sentence. Per 
of not doing this are set out in 
that sentence, both parties ("If 
either party fails so to do •. •) agree to pay expenses 
which arise out of their non-compliance with the terms and con-
ditions of the agreement. Attorneys' fees are expressly 
included in "expenses• by the last part of the sentence (". 
including a reasonable attorneys' fee"). Each party is 
entitled to attorneys' fees, whether incurred in enforcing 
rights created by the agreement, or created by breach of the 
agreement (" •.• arising out of the breach . . . ) . 
Judge Banks correctly concluded that an award of 
attorneys' fees to respondents was proper under this provision. 
The Judge's interpretation is supported by the language of the 
agreement and by substantial evidence,. and should not be dis-
turbed. Kohler v Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); car 
Doctor, Inc. v Belmont, 635 P.2d 82 (Utah 1981). Appellants 
had an obligation to fulfill and carry out the terms and 
tions of the agreement. They failed to do so by not obtaining 
zoning assurances required by clause 52. j, which excused 
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respundents' further performance. By the terms of that clause, 
respondents had the right not to purchase appellants' property 
if proper zoning was not obtained. Yet appellants filed suit 
anyway. Respondents were required to incur the attorneys' fees 
at issue to enforce their contractual right not to purchase the 
property. It would be contrary to the purposes of the attor-
neys' fee provision in the standard "Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase• agreement if attorneys fees are not awarded 
to r.espondents in these circur.istances. See, Hackford v. snow, 
657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) discussed below. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Interpreted 
Agreement as Requiring a Reciprocal Right 
to Attorneys' Fees. 
the 
Even if the language of the attorneys' fees provision 
is not totally clear, a reciprocal right to attorneys' fees 
should be implied from the language. Appellants admit (Plain-
tiffs' Mer.iorandum in Opposition To Award of Attorneys' Fees, R. 
710, and Transcript re. Attorneys Fees, July 2, 1982, pp. 1-b 
and 1-c, R. 713-714) that an award of attorneys' fees is proper 
in this type of action under the provisions of the "Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase• agreement. Indeed, appel-
lants have stated that if they "had prevailed on all issues .. 
and had presented evide:.nce as to attorneys' fees, [they] 
could have been awarded such fees and other expenses of 
enforcement.• (Memorandum in Opposition To an Award of Attor-
neys Fees, R.718) 
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However, appellants contend that respondents, who did 
prevail in this suit, are not entitled to an award of 
neys' fees under the same contractual provision. Appellants' 
interpretation of the contract is wrong and would lead to an 
inequitable result in this case, as well as many other cases 
arising under this widely used "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase• agreement. 
Respondents did not institute this lawsuit. Rather, 
they. were forced to defend themselves against appellants' 
claims which the jury and the court determined were unfounded. 
The successful defense was expensive and inconvenient. An 
interpretation of the contract that appellants are the only 
ones that may be awarded attorneys' fees effectively penalizes 
respondents for being the targets of an unsuccessful lawsuit. 
This is clearly not what the agreement intended. 
United States v. Peter Kiewit & sons Co., 235 F. Supp. 
500 (D.Alaska 1964) is a case that is not directly on point but 
does point out some criteria that should be considered in 
reaching 
language 
defended 
a reasonable and equitable interpretation of the 
at issue. In that case, 'defendants successfully 
against an action brought under the Miller Act, 40 
u.s.c. § § 270a-270e, and requested an award of attorneys' 
fees. Under the Act, ati;orneys' fees could be awarded if 
provided for by the law of the state in which the action 
arose. Sam Macri & Sons, Inc. v United States, 313 F.2d 119, 
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130 ( D. Alaska 1963). Under Alaskan law, Court Rule 82, an 
award of attorneys' fees is discretionary with the trial court 
in cases where there was no monetary award to the prevailing 
party. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that attorneys' 
fees should not be awarded because the action was not frivolous 
nor lacking in merit, and made the following comments: 
Defendants recognize that awarding 
costs and attorney's fees is discretionary 
with the court. They contend that they are 
entitled to recover costs and attorney's 
fees as a matter of fairness and equity. 
They make reference to the fact that the 
prayer of plaintiff's complaint requests 
judgment, interest, costs and attorney's 
fees. They contend that if plaintiff had 
been the prevailing party an award of costs 
and attorney's fees would have been entered 
in favor of plaintiff. They argue that it 
would be an extremely unfair rule or 
practice to award costs and attorney's fees 
when plaintiff prevails and to deny them 
when defendant prevails. 
The court is impressed with defendants' 
arguments and recognizes that a rule of 
practice awarding costs and attorney's fees 
should not be applied unilaterally and only 
in favor of prevailing plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff elected to commence this 
action. Defendants did not voluntarily 
become parties to this suit. They were 
summoned into court and are parties to this 
act ion solely by reason or proceedings 
initiated by the plaintiff. As a conse-
quence thereof defendants have been put to 
the expense of engaging the services of 
counsel for the purpose of preparing and 
presenting their defense. (emphasis added). 
Id. at 503. Although the court was applying the language of a 
statute rather than a contract, rules of construction discussed 
below support a similar approach to the interpretation of the 
contract at hand. 
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Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) affirmed a 
reciprocal construction of the very contractual language at 
issue. As in this case, the controversy centered around the 
sale of property and the interpretation of a standard "Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase• agreement. The trial 
court decision that was affirmed awarded attorneys' fees to the 
successful defendants. Although the defendants had counter-
claimed for specific performance, this Court's reasoning was 
based entirely on the fact that plaintiffs had "failed to 
comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement.• Id. at 
1277. This court emphasized that "the [trial] court erred in 
not awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party.• Id. at 
1277. This court did not tie its decision to the fact that 
defendant had sought affirmative relief from plaintiffs. See 
also, Taylor National, Inc. v. Jensen Brothers Construction 
641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982). 
A reciprocal right to attorneys' fees interpretation 
is also supported by ordinary rules of construction. First, a 
provision in a contract should be construed •so as to give 
effect to what the parties intended at. the time it [the agree-
ment] was made." Dubois v. tlye, 584 P.2d 823, 824 (Utah 
1978). see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Realty & 
Financial, Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975); Eie v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981); Nixon and 
Nixon, Inc. v. John llew & Associates, 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982); 
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\-Jingets Incorporated v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 
( 197 2). Here, the parties obviously intended that the agree-
ment encourage performance by both parties. A reciprocal 
interpretation satisfies this purpose since nonperformance by 
either party carries with it the risk of paying the other 
party's expenses of litigation. 
Second, a reciprocal interpretation leads to a more 
equitable and just result, in this and other cases. Such a 
result is clearly preferable to a harsh or inequitable one. 
Wlngets Incorporated v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 
(1972); Plain City Irrigation Co. v. Stoopes Irrigation Co., 11 
Utah 2d 188, 356 P.2d 625 (1960); Continental Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955). See also, the 
factors discussed in U.S. v. Peter Kiewit & sons, Inc. at 503. 
In Foy v. Anderson, 580 P.2d 114 (Mont. 1978), the 
court discussed the following equities in favor of awarding 
attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant: 
If equity is to be done in a situation such 
as this, the attorney fee must be sus-
tained. Plaintiff Anderson sought to bring 
defendant Eggan into the lawsuit when she 
had asserted no claim against .him and had no 
intention of doing so. For this reason she 
submitted a motion to dismiss which was 
granted l.Jy the trial court. Plaintiff 
Anderson forced her to secure the services 
of an attorney to examine the case and 
submit a motion _to dismiss and through no 
fault on her part -to incur attorney fees and 
costs. If defendant Eggan is dismissed from 
the case and not awarded attorney fees, she 
will not be made whole or returned to the 
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same position as before plaintiff Anderson 
attempted to bring her into the lawsuit. 
Id. at 117. 
Appellants' argue that the attorneys' fees provisior1 
should be construed against respondents, who, they claim, 
drafted the agreement. This argument is without merit because: 
(1) The rule of construction referred to by 
appellants aids a court only in construing the meaning 
of an ambiguous provision or contract. When a clause 
is not ambiguous or unclear (as is the case here) the 
rule is not invoked. Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit 
Association, 589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979); Auto Lease 
Co. v. Central Mutual Ins., 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 
264 (1958). 
(2) Even if the clause is ambiguous, the trial 
court's interpretation is controlling. Litho Sales 
Inc. v Cutrubus, 636 P. 2d 487 (Utah 1981); Car Doctor 
Inc. v Belmont, 635 P.2d 82 (Utah 1981). 
(3) Respondents were not the "drafters" of the 
agreement within the meaning of the rule. Seal v. 
Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965); 
Huber Rowland construction v. City of Salt Lake, 
Utah 2d 273, 323 P.2d 258 (1958). The agreement was 
not written by but was executed on a 
standard form that is intended to protect both parties 
an:l wa' supplied by appellants' real estate agent. If 
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i nter;:iretec.J cigai nst anyone, it should be the sellers, 
as the dominant parties. Both parties made additions 
to the agreer;ient, none of them relevant to attorneys' 
fees. 
( 4) The only case cited by appellants, Johnson 
Tire Service, Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 521 (Utah 
1980) does not support their argument at all. In 
Johnson Tire the issue was contract formation between 
two merchants under the Uniform Commercial Code. It 
had nothing to do with interpreting the language of a 
contract. 
In sur.1, as the trial court found, there is no support 
for the one-sided interpretation offered by appellants. 
Accordingly, respondents should also be awarded attorneys' fees 
incurred on this appeal. North Park Bank of Commerce v. 
Nichols, 645 P.2d 620 (Utah 1980); Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 
692 (Utah 1980); Edwards Pet Supply v. Bentley, 652 P .2d 889 
(Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The award of attorneys' fees by Judge Banks was 
proper. Respondents were forced to defend against appellants' 
groundless claims at great expense. The trial court awarded 
respondents their attorneys.' fees based on a reasonable inter-
pretation of the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" 
agreement as applied to the evidence. That determination is 
controlling. 
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Throughout the trial, appellants insisted that the 
agreement was binding and enforceable, but now argue, for the 
first time on appeal, that defendants' award was improper since 
the contract had really been extinguished. It 1s their posi-
tion that is inconsistent, as well as belated. 
Appellants attempt to portray themselves as the 
victiQs here. The jury found otherwise and that finding is not 
disputed by this appeal. It is respondents who have been vie-
timized, as the result of the assertion of their rights under 
the contract. The contract calls for an award of fees in these 
circumstances to the prevailing party, regardless of whether 
that party is the defendant 
Accordingly, respondents respectfully urge that the 
trial court be affirmed and that they be awarded reasonable 
attorneys' fees on as well. 
DATED this // of July, 1983 
Gordon Strachan 
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